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1. Introduction 
 
To “encourage” correct tax reporting it is likely that enforcement effort, audits and 
penalties, will continue to be a primary tool in the tax authority’s arsenal.  However, many tax 
agencies are exploring complementary instruments of which one is the provision of information 
and assistance services to taxpayers.  This revised paradigm recognizes that tax administrators 
have a role as facilitators and a provider of services to taxpayer-citizens.  Almost everyone 
agrees that the personal income tax system in the US is complex.  It is counterproductive to make 
information resolving the complexity costly to obtain and/or unreliable.2   Further, the “service” 
paradigm for tax administration fits squarely with the perspective that emphasizes the role of 
social norms play in tax compliance (Feld and Frey, 2002).   
The effect of such service programs on tax reporting is an open empirical question but 
intuitively, more reliable and available service programs will be more likely to positively affect 
tax reporting behavior.  Testing such a proposition requires an analysis of individual-level data 
under alternative information service settings.  While some changes in the service programs have 
                                                 
1Funding provided by IRS under TRNO – 09Z – 00019.  The views expressed are those of the authors and do not 
reflect the opinions of the IRS or of any researchers working within the IRS.  An earlier version was presented at the 
New Perspectives on Tax Administration: An IRS-TPC Research Conference, June 22, 2011.  We are grateful to the 
participants and to Marsha Blumenthal in particular for comments that improved the paper.  
2 The value of the taxpayer service derives from the costs imposed on the taxpayer for non-compliance.  For the 
payoff maximizing individual, absent enforcement effort, service that resolves tax liability uncertainty would have 
no value to the taxpayer.  However, a taxpayer wishing to honestly report would value the information since it 
would enable such honesty. 
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been undertaken in the past, there is not a full spectrum of such programs in existence and so 
field data are incomplete.  Just as important, even for taxpayers that undergo a full audit, the 
determination of tax liability is vulnerable to audit error.  
As an alternative to analyzing field data, our research utilizes controlled laboratory 
experiments with human decision makers and salient financial incentives. Within the laboratory, 
we determine (hence, know) the true tax liability, and then identify the effects of information 
services by systematically varying the setting across groups of players. In particular, our 
experimental design varies the degree of accessibility and accuracy of information services. Our 
design allows us to observe both the tax reporting behavior as well as the propensity of the 
taxpayer to obtain information by making information acquisition a (sometimes costly) choice.  
 
2. Experimental Design and Treatments 
Our experimental design includes many of the fundamental elements of the voluntary 
reporting system of the U.S. individual income tax.  In each decision period of the experiment, 
participants earn income by performing a task and self-report their tax liability to a tax authority. 
Tax liability is (possibly) uncertain, and is a function of earned income, the tax rate, and tax 
credits applied. If an audit occurs, unreported taxes are discovered without error. If the 
participant has evaded taxes both the unpaid taxes and a penalty are collected.  The participant’s 
earnings for the decision period, which are denominated in “lab dollars”, are her earned income 
less taxes paid (and penalties, if applicable). The overall earnings for the experiment are the sum 
of the lab dollars earned over all decision periods multiplied by a common (and known) lab to 
US dollar exchange rate. We discuss further the details of the experiment below. 
In each period of the experiment, participants earn income based upon their performance 
in a simple computerized task, in which they are required to sort numbers into the correct order.  
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Those who finish the task the fastest earn the highest income of 1500 lab dollars for the period, 
those who finish in the middle of pack earn 1250 lab dollars, and the slowest earn 1000 lab 
dollars. Participants are presented information about the distribution of group earnings to ensure 
that they believe the relative nature of the earnings. The earnings task is the only source of 
interaction and payoff interdependence; the design implements a blind setting among the 
participants. 
After earning income, participants are presented with a screen that informs them of the 
earnings information and the tax policy parameters (tax rate, audit probability, and penalty rate) 
which are fixed throughout the experiment.3 The decisions the participants make in the period 
are whether to request an information service (if one exists) and how much to claim in tax 
credits. Although other institutional details are embedded in the design (e.g. tax rate, taxable 
income, etc.), and in particular the tax form, the participant can only manipulate her tax liability 
through her credit reporting choice. As there are penalties for tax under reporting if audited, and 
foregone earnings associated with over-paying taxes, there is value to resolving any uncertainty 
regarding the tax credit. The expected tax credit starts at 1000 for an income of zero and declines 
at a rate of 0.5 for each additional dollar of income. The amount of the credit is high relative to 
the initial tax liability so that the credit decision is financially salient.  
We implement uncertainty in the credit by placing uniform distributions around the 
                                                 
3 Our experimental setting is very contextual and the presence of the income earning task provides, we argue, for the 
necessary degree of “parallelism” to the naturally occurring world that is crucial to the applicability of experimental 
results (Smith, 1982; Plott, 1987).  The experimental setting need not – and should not – attempt to capture all of the 
variation in the naturally occurring environment, but it should include the fundamental elements of the naturally 
occurring world for the results to be relevant in policy debates.  In this regard, our experimental design uses tax 
language (which is presented via the subject interface), requires that the participants earn income in each period, and 
also requires that the participants disclose tax liabilities in the same manner as in the typical tax form.  As in the 
naturally occurring setting, there is a time limit on the filing of income.  A clock at the bottom of the screen reminds 
the participants of the time remaining, and there is a penalty for failing to file on time set equal in all sessions to 10 
percent of taxes owed; also, the individual is automatically audited if he or she fails to file on time, so that the 
participant pays the non-compliance fine as well. 
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expected credit amounts, and then randomly drawing from the distributions to determine the true 
credit amounts. In particular, the true credit amount can be anything in the range of the expected 
credit plus or minus 100%. With uncertainty, prior to making a credit choice or acquiring 
information (if possible), each participant sees the supports of the uniform distribution that 
coincides with her income. If an information service is available, participants can acquire the 
information with the click of a button.4 
The participants are informed of the audit probability and the penalty rate, and know 
these values with certainty.  In all sessions we fix the tax rate at 50% of earned income, the audit 
probability at 30%, and the penalty rate at 300% of unpaid taxes.  Our audit rate is much higher 
than actual full audit rates in the United States.  However, the IRS conducts a range of audits, 
and for many types of audits the actual rates are quite high.5  The penalty rate is consistent with 
penalties imposed by the IRS for tax underreporting.  Enforcement effort is held constant since 
the effects of enforcement efforts have been widely investigated and we only need this effort to 
be salient in the current setting to give value to the information that resolves tax liability 
uncertainty.6 Table 1 reports the key parameters of the experiment. 
Participants are able to revise their credit decision prior to filing their return, and the tax 
form updates their tax liability as the claimed credit is revised. Thus, they can observe the 
potential changes in their reported tax liability for each potential reporting strategy they 
                                                 
4 Such information reduces the cognitive burden of computing tax liabilities. The issue of tax liability uncertainty 
differs from enforcement uncertainty.  As Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992b) demonstrate, the tax authority may use 
enforcement uncertainty to increase compliance.  Theory predicts that uncertain penalties increase compliance by 
risk-averse agents and this is borne out in the data from a set of experiments.  Alm and McKee (2006) extend this 
and report on the compliance effects of informing the taxpayer their return will be audited with certainty. 
5 While overall audit rates are quite low, among certain income and occupation classes they are more frequent.  The 
oft-reported IRS audit rate (currently less than one percent) is somewhat of an understatement.  This reported rate 
usually refers to full audits.  In fact, the IRS conducts a wide range of audit-type activities, including line matching 
and requests for information, and these activities are much more frequent.  For example, in 2005 only 1.2 million 
individual returns (or less than one percent of the 131 million individual returns filed) were actually audited. 
However, in that year the IRS sent 3.1 million “math error notices” and received from third parties nearly 1.5 billion 
“information returns”, which are used to verify items reported on individual income tax returns. 
6 See Alm, Jackson, and McKee, 1992a. 
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investigate.  A timer at the bottom of the tax form counts down the remaining time. The 
participants are allowed 90 seconds to file and the counter begins to flash when there are fifteen 
seconds remaining.  Thus, the process in the lab mimics that by which a taxpayer may well 
conduct different calculations in the time prior to actually filing her taxes (whether he or she uses 
one of the available tax software programs or simply does the tax return by hand). If an 
information service is available, this can be requested at any time. 
Audits are determined by the use of a “virtual” bingo cage that appears on the computer 
screen.  A box with blue and white bingo balls appears on the screen following the tax filing.  
The ratio of blue to white balls determines the audit probability.  The balls begin to bounce 
around in the box, and after a brief interval a door opens at the top of the box.  If a blue ball 
exits, the participant is audited; a white ball signifies no audit.  The audit applies only to the 
current period declarations, not to previous (or future) periods.  The computer automatically 
deducts taxes paid and penalties (if any are owed) from participants’ accounts.   
When an audit occurs, the true value of the credit is used to determine taxes owed.  The 
individual’s declarations are examined.  If the individual has under-reported her tax liability, she 
must make up for the difference as well as pay a penalty.  If an individual has over-reported their 
tax liability no over payments are returned to the individual.7 Tax revenues and any penalties 
paid are not distributed to the participants; tax collections are not used to provide a public good 
in order to ensure that the participants focus on the individual income disclosure decision and not 
on any public good provision decision.  After the tax return is filed and an audit (if any) is 
determined, participants see one final screen that summarizes everything that happened during 
the period.  This process is repeated for a total of 20 paid rounds, but to minimize potential end-
                                                 
7 Certain errors on the part of the taxpayer may not be easily verified in the event of an audit.  For example, failure 
to claim a deduction for a charitable contribution because the taxpayer was uncertain of the status (e.g., 501c(3) 
status) of the organization may not be observed by the tax agency even in the event of an audit. 
 6
of-game effects the number of rounds is not disclosed.   
2.1 Participant pool and detailed procedures 
The experiments were conducted at dedicated experimental laboratories at the University 
of Tennessee and Appalachian State University, which both utilized the same software and 
experimental protocol, and have similar computer networks. The participant pools included 
students and non-students (university staff, mostly).8 Student and non-students participated at 
separate times, and the lone difference in student versus non-student sessions is that the latter 
utilized a higher lab dollar to US dollar exchange rate (375 to 1 versus 750 to 1) in order to 
reflect the higher opportunity cost of participation. Recruiting was conducted using the Online 
Recruiting System for Experimental Economics (ORSEE) developed by Greiner (2004).  
Databases of potential participants were built using announcements sent via email to university 
students and staff.  Registered individuals were contacted, via email, and were permitted to 
participate in only one tax experiment.9 Only participants recruited specifically for a session 
were allowed to participate, and no participant had prior experience in this experimental setting.  
Methods adhere to all guidelines concerning the ethical treatment of human participants.  
Earnings averaged $25 for student participants and $45 for non-students. Sessions lasted between 
60 and 90 minutes. A total of 730 participants took part in these sessions. 
The experiment session proceeds in the following fashion.  Each participant sits at a 
computer located in a cubicle, and is not allowed to communicate with other participants.  The 
instructions are conveyed by a series of computer screens that the participants read at their own 
pace, with a printed summary sheet provided and read aloud by the experimenter (see Appendix 
for an example).  Clarification questions are addressed after the participants have completed the 
                                                 
8 An individual session included only students or non-student participants – they were not mixed in a session. 
9 Other experimental projects were ongoing at the time and participants may have participated in other types of 
experiments. 
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instructions and two practice rounds.  The participants are informed that all decisions will be 
private; the experimenter is unable to observe the decisions, and the experimenter does not move 
about the room once the session starts to emphasize the fact that the experimenter is not 
observing the participants’ compliance decisions.  This reduces, to the extent possible, peer and 
experimenter effects that could affect the decisions of the participants.  All actions that 
participants take are made on their computer. After the 20 paid decision periods, participants are 
asked to fill out a brief questionnaire which collects basic demographics including information 
on tax reporting experience.  Payments are made privately at the end of the session. 
2.2 Treatments 
We employ a between-subjects design, where the treatment variables across sessions are 
the presence/absence of an information service, the quality of the service if provided, and the 
cost of obtaining the information. These are held constant throughout a session.  There are five 
basic treatments (see Table 2). The first (T1) is a treatment with certain tax liability, which we 
use as a baseline for comparison against uncertain information treatment. In this treatment, 
participants are automatically given information on their true credit. In the second treatment 
(T2), the individual’s tax credit is uncertain and there is no information service available. This 
establishes a second baseline for comparison. In the remaining three treatments, there is an 
information service available. The status quo in the information service treatments, i.e. if the 
information service is not utilized, is identical to the uncertainty baseline. 
The “perfect” information service reveals the true credit with certainty (T3). Under the 
other two information service types, the service is imperfect in the sense that up to two possible 
credit amounts can be provided and each amount has a 50% chance of being correct. 
Specifically, under the “simultaneous” information service treatment (T4) the authority 
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simultaneously provides two credit amounts, one of which is the truth while the other is a decoy. 
With the “sequential” information service (T5), the participant can make up to two information 
requests and with each request is delivered one possible credit amount. If two requests are made, 
then the simultaneous and sequential services reveal the same information. However, the 
sequential information treatment leaves the possibility that only one credit amount is delivered, 
in which case it still has the same 50% chance of being the truth.  
To assess the value of information services, we vary (between sessions) the cost to 
acquire information in the information service treatments (see Table 1). The three cost levels are 
$0, $50 and $100 for the perfect and the simultaneous information settings. For the sequential 
setting, these costs are halved and assessed separately for the two sources. 
2.3 Testable hypotheses 
To derive testable implications based on economic theory, we draw heavily from the 
theoretical model derived in Vossler, McKee and Jones (2010).  In particular, the experimental 
game described above represents a special case of the theory, one in which the taxpayer makes a 
decision on a single “line item” and the taxpayer is required to file a return. With our 
experimental parameters, assuming risk neutrality, when the true credit is certain the taxpayer 
will optimally choose to report truthfully. When the credit is uncertain, for all levels of earned 
income, the taxpayer will over-claim the credit. The extent of the deviation from truthful 
reporting increases with the level of uncertainty. As those with the lowest income have the 
widest range of possible credits, theory suggests the highest relative amount of over-claiming for 
these individuals. Point predictions from the theory have that it is optimal to over-report the tax 
credit by 333 lab dollars for those with earned income of 1000, over-report by 250 for those with 
an income of 1250, and over-report by 167 for those with an income of 1500. 
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Tying in the imperfect information service, when the uncertainty is reduced to two 
possible credit outcomes, the optimal decision is to report one of the two possible amounts. With 
our chosen parameters it is optimal to choose the higher of the two amounts. Intuitively, it is not 
optimal to choose something in the middle of the two amounts as, in expectation, you forego an 
allowable credit and pay a larger penalty. Theoretically, although the information is nevertheless 
valuable to the player, tax underreporting is actually higher with two information sources than in 
the case of no information (i.e. the base uncertainty situation). This is a general theoretical result 
that does not depend on our choice of parameters. Intuitively this is driven by the fact that under 
full uncertainty one’s decision is driven by the expected value of the underlying credit 
distribution – which is the true credit –, whereas the higher (lower) of the two draws is away 
from the truth on average. But, to be clear here, the information is valuable to the player. 
The decision of whether to request the information service(s) to resolve (some) 
uncertainty is driven by the value of information. Theoretically, and quite intuitively, the 
taxpayer’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) is increasing in the level of uncertainty as well as the 
accuracy of the information. In the context of the experimental design, those with lower incomes 
face a larger range of uncertainty and, ceteris paribus, have a higher WTP for information.10 
Further, knowing the true credit is more valuable than receiving two possible amounts only one 
of which is correct.11 In terms of point predictions, since information has value, in all situations 
information should be requested when it is free. At the other extreme, in all situations no 
information should be requested at our highest cost amount of 100 (or 50 for one imperfect 
information source). At the middle cost amount, those at the lowest income level should request 
                                                 
10 This may be partially offset by the income effect since information is expected to be a normal good. 
11 This stems from the adage that “if a person has one clock she always knows what time it is but if she has two 
clocks she is never quite sure.” 
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the information (imperfect or perfect), at the middle income level it is beneficial to request 
perfect information, and it is not beneficial for those with high income to request information. 
The main testable implications of the theory are summarized below as formal hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. The level of tax underreporting is higher when tax liability is uncertain. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Tax underreporting increases with the level of uncertainty (i.e. decreases 
with income) 
 
Hypothesis 3. Tax underreporting decreases when information services are provided. 
 
Hypothesis 4.Tax underreporting decreases when information service quality improves. 
 
 
3. Results of the Data Analysis 
 
In the analysis that follows, we largely let the data “speak” by specifying OLS regression 
models that simply allow the mean outcome to differ across unique experiment scenarios. As 
such, the purpose of the regression is largely to estimate appropriate standard errors for the 
means and to facilitate hypothesis testing. On this note, to control for possible heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation of unknown form, we use robust standard errors with clustering at the 
participant-level. Further, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust t and F statistics are used 
when evaluating hypotheses. To more parsimoniously illustrate some key patterns in the data, we 
also estimate models that implement some additional structure.   
 Tables 3 – 5 present three models using the credit decision data.12 In all models we use as 
the dependent variable the difference between the credits claimed on the tax form and the 
expected amount of the credit. Formulating the dependent variable in this way allows the model 
parameters to be interpreted as the average amount of tax underreporting. The expected credit 
                                                 
12 The analysis excludes the 6 rounds out of 14,600 (730 participants x 20 rounds) where the tax form “timed out”.  
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depends upon treatment conditions and is measured from the perspective of the participant.13 
That is, in our baseline certainty treatment or when perfect information is obtained in Treatment 
3, the expected credit is simply the true credit. In uncertainty treatments where no information is 
acquired, the expected credit is simply the midpoint of the uncertainty interval. When two 
sources of information are obtained in Treatments 4 and 5, the expected credit is the average of 
the two. Finally, with one (imperfect) information source, the expectation is simply the average 
between the information draw and the midpoint of the uncertainty interval.  
 Model I estimates the average level of tax underreporting separately by each income level 
and each treatment. Model II extends the analysis to allow the average level of underreporting to 
be based on whether an information service was acquired and, if so, the type of service. To 
accomplish this, we define four new experiment “conditions”. The first includes observations 
from information service treatments where information was not acquired (“No Information”). 
The remaining three correspond to observations where information was acquired: “Perfect 
Information” is associated with Treatment 3; “Two Information Sources” is associated with 
Treatment 4, and those in Treatment 5 who sequentially requested information from both 
sources; and “One Information Source” is associated with Treatment 5 for those who obtained 
one of the two available services. Finally, the main effects of income and information cost 
(where relevant), are estimated by experiment condition in Model III. 
One prominent effect, as evidenced by all models, is that the tax underreporting is 
increasing in income (i.e. decreasing with the degree of uncertainty). This is in the opposite 
direction predicted by theory (Hypothesis 2), but consistent with our earlier findings in a related 
                                                 
13 This formulation is consistent with the theory, which is also from the perspective of the taxpayer. However, since 
the information services are unbiased, and given a large number of random credit draws are accumulated over 
participants and rounds, if we instead use the actual level of tax under reporting as the dependent variable this 
should only lead to trivial differences in results. 
 12
experiment (Vossler, McKee and Jones, 2010). A second, basic implication of the theory is that 
the presence of uncertainty increases tax underreporting (Hypothesis 1). Comparing our certainty 
and uncertainty baselines, there is weak evidence of this effect. Underreporting is roughly 60 to 
70 lab dollars higher for all income levels, but this difference is only marginally significant at the 
middle income level (p-value=0.08; based on Model I or II). Inconsistent with Hypothesis 3, 
levels of under reporting do not differ based on the quality of the information service. In 
particular, there are no statistical differences across the three information service conditions, 
either by income level (Model II: p=0.83 @1000; p=0.55 @1250; p=0.36 @1500) or, based on 
the main effects specification, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal intercepts, income 
effects and cost effects across the three conditions (Model III: F6,729=1.39; p=0.22). Further, even 
with all participants pooled regardless of whether they acquired information, there are no 
differences across Treatments 3, 4 and 5 (Model I: p=0.78 @1000; p=0.77 @1250; p=0.41 
@1500). 
 Our most important findings are that information services decrease tax underreporting for 
those that acquire the information and – even though services are acquired roughly 58% of the 
time – for the service treatments as a whole (i.e. Hypothesis 4 is supported). The joint finding is 
most important since information acquisition is a choice, and it could simply serve to sort the 
players into inherently compliant and non-compliant groups – with the overall effect of 
information being a wash. Model II illustrates that those who access the information service have 
the lowest levels of underreporting. In fact, those receiving information under report roughly 
80%, 70% and 60% less, across the respective income levels, as compared to those in the 
uncertainty baseline. The differences in tax underreporting levels is statistically significant 
beyond the 5% level between any of the three information service conditions and the certainty 
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baseline, uncertainty baseline or no information condition (at any income level). Also evident 
from Model II, participants in the information service treatments who do not acquire information 
(i.e. the “No Information” subgroup) tend to have reasonably high levels of underreporting, 
albeit similar to the levels of underreporting in the uncertainty baseline.  
Model I supports the finding that there is overall less tax underreporting in the 
information service treatments. Comparing Treatments 3, 4 and 5 with the uncertainty baseline 
suggests overall tax under reporting is cut in half. In eight of the nine possible cases, 
underreporting is significantly different – and lower – for the information service treatment 
relative to the uncertainty baseline. The lone exception is when comparing Treatment 4 and the 
uncertainty baseline at the high income level, where the effect is in the expected direction but 
marginal (t=1.62; p=0.11). We summarize the results based on our analysis of the credit decision 
succinctly below:  
Result 1.Tax underreporting decreases with the level of uncertainty (i.e. increases with 
income). 
 
Result 2.The quality, as measured by accuracy, of the information service has no effect 
on tax underreporting. 
 
Result 3.Those who acquire information underreport significantly less than those who do 
not. Further, unconditional on whether the information service was acquired, the 
availability of information services has the overall effect of reducing tax underreporting. 
 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Our most important finding is that, as predicted by economic theory, the provision of 
information – even when the quality is low – significantly increases tax compliance. Other 
hypotheses are not fully supported by the data and undoubtedly more about taxpayer behavior 
will be revealed through a more intricate data analysis. We have not yet investigated subject pool 
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effects for these treatments but other work using data from similar experimental settings suggests 
that observed behavior is broadly consistent across pools (Alm, Bloomquist, and McKee, 
2011).14 Further research is being undertaken with the data reported in this paper to investigate 
the decision to acquire information as well as the factors affecting the propensity to take a second 
“draw” in the sequential information setting. 
When the tax system is complex taxpayers are predicted to respond positively to the 
provision of information services that reduce the costs of computing true tax liabilities.  The 
results reported here demonstrate that, first, with tax uncertainty the level of underreporting 
increases, second, when information services are provided the level of underreporting is lowered, 
and third, that the aggregate level of underreporting is lowered even when only a fraction (58%) 
of the participants avail themselves of the information service.  The experimental setting does 
not incorporate a cost of the service to the tax agency but the improved underreporting behavior 
suggests a potential for a positive return from this service.  As a final observation, the 
participants respond to the costs of the service in a predictable fashion.  While the “costs” in the 
experimental setting are monetary, we would expect a similar response to higher costs in the 
form of transaction costs, including waiting time.  We are currently researching this topic.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Further, as noted above, Alm, Bloomquist, and McKee (2011) demonstrate the external validity of the 
experimental setting through a series of comparisons with field data results.  This effectively addresses the criticisms 
of some who have questioned the use of lab experiments in tax compliance research (see Gravelle, 2008 
(commenting on Alm et.al., 2008); Cadsby, Maynes, and Trivedi, 2006). Recall, for the current experiments we have 
conducted sessions at 2 institutions and with 2 pools (students and non-students) at each.  Thus we have several 
ways the pool effects could be analyzed. 
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Table 1. Experiment Parameters  
Parameter / variable Value(s) 
Earned Income  1000, 1250 or 1500 lab dollars 
Audit Probability  30%  
Penalty Rate  300% on unpaid taxes 
Tax rate  50% on taxable income 
Tax Deduction 50% × Earned Income (pre filled on tax form) 
Tax Credit Expected value:  1000 – (0.5×Earned Income) 
Range: +/- 100% of expected value 
Information Cost 
(if service is available) 
0, 50 or 100 lab dollars 
 
 
 
Table 2.Experiment Treatments 
Tax Liability 
Uncertain 
Service Provided? 
  
No 
One Source 
(Complete 
and Correct) 
Two Simultaneous 
Sources (One 
Correct) 
Two Sequential 
Sources (One 
Correct) 
No T1 
 
N/A N/A N/A 
Yes T2 T3 
Price of 
Information: 
 $0, $50, $100
T4 
Price of 
Information: 
 $0, $50, $100 
T5 
Price of 
Information: 
 $0, $50, $100 
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Table 3.Credit Decision Model I 
Dependent Variable: Credit claimed – (Expected) credit 
 
Treatment 1 
(Certainty 
Baseline) 
Treatment 2
(Uncertainty 
Baseline)
Treatment 3
(Perfect Info 
Available)
Treatment 4 
(Simultan. Info 
Available) 
Treatment 5
(Sequential Info 
Available)
Income=1000 
 
160.36** 
(31.38) 
219.28** 
(29.61) 
72.61** 
(26.13) 
46.18* 
(26.76) 
59.82** 
(20.68) 
Income=1250 186.97** 
(30.52) 
260.38** 
(27.79) 
148.82** 
(20.04) 
135.95** 
(18.16) 
154.43** 
(18.57) 
Income=1500 257.32** 
(32.32) 
310.31** 
(35.37) 
208.37** 
(20.81) 
242.83** 
(21.89) 
206.37** 
(21.59) 
N=14,594 
R2=0.25 
F=30.89** 
Note: * and ** denotes estimates that are statistically different from zero at the 10% and 5% 
significance levels, respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 4.Credit Decision Model II 
 
Dependent Variable: Credit claimed – (Expected) credit 
 Experiment Condition 
 
Certainty 
Baseline 
Uncertainty 
Baseline 
No 
Information
Perfect 
Information
Two 
Information 
Sources 
One 
Information 
Source 
Income=1000 
 
160.36** 
(31.38) 
219.28** 
(29.61) 
76.67** 
(24.83) 
46.79** 
(22.45) 
45.21** 
(16.75) 
22.82 
(36.57) 
Income=1250 186.97** 
(30.52) 
260.38** 
(27.79) 
218.84** 
(19.07) 
72.20** 
(20.10) 
98.21** 
(12.59) 
91.50** 
(27.16) 
Income=1500 257.32** 
(32.32) 
310.31** 
(35.37) 
363.36** 
(21.01) 
111.39** 
(17.52) 
143.04** 
(14.43) 
117.73** 
(44.99) 
N=14594 
R2=0.29 
F=28.79** 
Notes: * and ** denotes estimates that are statistically different from zero at the 10% and 5% 
significance levels, respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Credit Decision Model III  
 
Dependent Variable: Credit claimed – (Expected) credit 
 Experiment Condition 
 
Certainty 
Baseline 
Uncertainty 
Baseline 
No 
Information
Perfect 
Information
Two 
Information 
Sources 
One 
Information 
Source 
Intercept -47.38 
(102.03) 
-64.83 
(94.26) 
-428.11** 
(87.21) 
-81.34 
(62.03) 
-135.73** 
(52.09) 
153.81 
(141.60) 
Income  0.20** 
(0.08) 
0.26** 
(0.08) 
0.59** 
(0.06) 
0.16** 
(0.05) 
0.20** 
(0.04) 
0.17** 
(0.11) 
Information Cost   -1.02** (0.47) 
-1.31** 
(0.39) 
-0.73** 
(0.24) 
-0.85 
(0.80) 
N=14,594 
R2=0.29 
F=40.08* 
Notes: * and ** denotes estimates that are statistically different from zero at the 10% and 5% 
significance levels, respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix. Example Experiment Summary Sheet (Treatment 3, Cost of $50) 
 
Experiment Overview 
 You will be participating in a market simulation that lasts several decision “rounds”. In each 
round, you first play an earnings game and then face a tax reporting decision. 
 
 In the earnings game, you sort the numbers 1 through 9. Your Income earned is determined 
by how fast you sort the numbers relative to others. The participant in your group with the 
fastest time receives the highest Income earned. 
 
 In the tax reporting stage, you fill out and file a tax form. How much you earn from the tax 
reporting decision depends on how much you claim in Tax Credit and whether or not you are 
audited. Note that the on-screen instructions do not specify the tax policy parameters (e.g. tax 
rate, penalty rate, etc.), but those specified below will be in effect for this experiment. 
 
 Each round is completely independent from the others, which means your decisions in one 
round in no way affect the outcome of any other round. 
 
How your earnings are determined each round 
 On the tax form, your Initial Taxes will be calculated automatically. This amount is 
determined by multiplying your Income earned by a tax rate of 50%.  
 
 You decide how much to claim in Tax Credit on the tax form. Each dollar you claim in 
credits reduces your Final taxes by one dollar. This amount is subtracted from the Initial 
Taxes to determine your Final Taxes. If Final Taxes is a negative number, this reflects a tax 
refund.  
 
 You will be shown a range of tax credits (this range is highlighted in white on the left side of 
the decision screen), which depends on your Income earned. Each amount within the range 
has an equal chance of being your actual tax credit, which is the highest amount you can 
claim without possible penalty. You can choose to claim any amount between 0 and 1000.  
 
 You have an information service available to you at a cost of $50. By clicking on the 
“Request Information” button you will know the exact amount of your actual tax credit. 
 
 You have a 30% chance of being audited. Audits are determined completely at random and 
do not depend on how much you or anyone else claims in tax credits. 
 
 If you are not audited, your earnings for the round are your Income earned minus Final taxes. 
 
 If you are audited, but claimed less than or equal to the actual tax credit, your earnings for 
the round are your Income earned minus Final taxes. Know that if you under-reported the 
credit you will not receive additional money through the audit process.  
 
 If you are audited, and claimed more than the actual tax credit, you pay back the extra tax 
credit you claimed and also pay a penalty.  
o The penalty is equal to 300% multiplied by the amount of extra tax credit you 
claimed. Thus, if you claimed an extra $100 your penalty is $100*300% or $300. 
o Your earnings for the round are then Income earned minus Final taxes minus the extra 
tax credit you claimed minus the penalty. 
